The long read: A wave of populist revolts has led many to lose faith in the wisdom of people power. But such eruptions are essential to the vitality of modern politics
Everyone seems to agree that democracy is under attack. What is surprising is how many of its usual friends have come to fear democracy itself or perhaps to fear that a countrys people, too inflamed by narrow passions, risk turning politics into a distasteful blood sport, pitting The People vs Democracy, in the startling words of one recent book title.
Observers have understandable qualms about political programmes that are alarmingly illiberal, yet obviously democratic, in that most citizens support them. In Poland and Hungary, democratically elected ruling parties attack Muslim migrants for undermining Christian identity. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte rules with an iron fist, pledging to put drug pushers in funeral parlours, not prisons.
Modern democracies all rest on a claim of popular sovereignty the proposition that all legitimate governments grow out of the power of a people, and in some way are subject to its will. Yet when a large majority of a countrys people vehemently supports policies a critic finds abhorrent, many liberals, even avowed democrats, recoil in horror.
Thus arises the possibility of a painful paradox: that democracies end when they are too democratic. So concluded a 2016 piece by the US political observer Andrew Sullivan, resurrecting an argument made two generations earlier by Samuel Huntington (in a 1975 report called The Crisis of Democracy, issued in the wake of the international student revolts of the 1960s).
Even the leftwing scholar Chantal Mouffe, who has long championed raw populist conflict as the essence of radical democracy, seems distraught at current events. Democracy that is in good working order with conflict, but where people accept the existence of their adversaries is not easy to re-establish, she recently told an interviewer, gesturing implicitly toward tolerance, one of the most jeopardised liberal norms in the current context: Im not that optimistic.
Current affairs may seem especially bleak, but fears about democracy are nothing new. At the zenith of direct democracy in ancient Athens, in the fifth century BC, one critic called it a patent absurdity and so it seemed to most political experts from Aristotle to Edmund Burke, who considered democracy the most shameless thing in the world. As the American founding father John Adams warned, there never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide.
For almost 2,000 years, most western political theorists agreed with Aristotle, Burke and Adams: nobody could imagine seriously advocating democracy as an ideal form of government. It was only at the end of the 18th century that democracy reappeared as a modern political ideal, during the French Revolution.
Ever since, popular insurrections and revolts in the name of democracy have become a recurrent feature of global politics. It needs to be stressed: these revolts are not an unfortunate blemish on the peaceful forward march toward a more just society; they form the heart and soul of modern democracy as a living reality.
It is a familiar story: out of the blue, it seems, a crowd pours into a city square or gathers at a barnstorming rally held by a spellbinding orator, to protest against hated institutions, to express rage at the betrayals of the ruling class, to seize control of public spaces. To label these frequently disquieting moments of collective freedom populist, in a pejorative sense, is to misunderstand a constitutive feature of the modern democratic project.
Yet these episodes of collective self-assertion are invariably fleeting, and often provoke a political backlash in turn. The political disorder they create stands in tension with the need for a more stable, peaceful form of collective participation. That is one reason why many modern democrats have tried to create representative institutions that can through liberal protections for the freedom of religion, and of the press, and the civil rights of minorities both express, and tame, the will of a sovereign people.
Thus the great French philosopher Condorcet in 1793 proposed creating a new, indirect form of self-rule, linking local assemblies to a national government. By ingrafting representation upon democracy, as Condorcets friend Tom Paine put it, the people could exercise their power both directly, in local assemblies, and indirectly, by provisionally entrusting some of their powers to elected representatives.
Under the pressure of events, another ardent French democrat, Robespierre, went further and defended the need, amid a civil war, for a temporary dictatorship precisely to preserve the possibility of building a more enduring form of representative democracy, once its enemies had been defeated and law and order could be restored.
But there was a problem with these efforts to establish a modern democracy at scale. Especially in a large nation such as France or the US, representative institutions and, even worse, dictatorial regimes claiming a popular mandate inevitably risk frustrating anyone hoping to play a more direct role in political decision-making.
This means that the democratic project, both ancient and modern, is inherently unstable. The modern promise of popular sovereignty, repeatedly frustrated, produces recurrent efforts at asserting the collective power of a people. If observers like the apparent result of such an effort, they may hail it as a renaissance of the democratic spirit; if they do not, they are liable to dismiss these episodes of collective self-assertion as mob rule, or populism run amok.
No matter. Even though the post-second world war consensus over the meaning and value of liberal democratic institutions seems more fragile than ever polls show that trust in elected representatives has rarely been lower democracy as furious dissent flourishes, in vivid and vehement outbursts of anger at remote elites and shadowy enemies.
It is important to sharply distinguish democracy from liberalism two value-laden words that, in recent years, have become almost hopelessly conflated and confused, especially in the work of social scientists and western political pundits who fret that western liberal democracy, once the promised land, has become the enemy in places like Hungary.
Unlike democracy, liberalism is a relatively late addition to our political lexicon. In Europe, the word first came into wide usage in the 19th century by various political theorists and statesmen in France, Germany and Italy, united in their horror at the bloodshed of the French Revolution, but otherwise varied in their positive views.
Modern democracy also has no necessary connection to liberalism. The Protestant champions of popular sovereignty in the 16th century summoned it for the express purpose of dethroning rulers with whose religious views they disagreed: It was not religious liberty they sought, but the elimination of wrong religions, as the historian Edmund Morgan wrote in 1988.